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Abstract—This paper analyzes the evolution of inequality in Poland
during the economic transition that began in 1989–1990. Using microdata
from the Household Budget Surveys, we  nd that, after a brief spike in
1989, income and consumption inequality actually declined to below
pretransitio n levels during 1990–1992 and then increased gradually, rising
only moderately above pretransition levels by 1997. In sharp contrast ,
inequality in labor earnings increased markedly and consistently through-
out the 1990–1997 period. We  nd that social transfer mechanisms,
including pensions , played an important role in mitigating increases in
both overall inequality and poverty. We argue that, from a political
economy perspective , transfer mechanisms were well designed to reduce
political resistance to market-oriente d reforms in the early years of
transition , paving the way for rapid growth. Finally, we provide cross-
country evidence from the transition economies that is consisten t with our
interpretatio n of the Polish experience and is also consistent with recent
work in growth theory suggesting that redistributio n that reduces inequal-
ity can enhance growth.
I. Introduction
AMONG the most dramatic economic events of theearly 1990s was the beginning of the process of trans-
formation of countries in Eastern Europe from planned to
market economies. These transition economies have had
considerably different experiences in terms of the speed and
success of transition and in terms of macroeconomic out-
comes including output growth. But a widely held view is
that, in all of these economies, the economic upheaval
associated with the process of transition has led to substan-
tial increases in inequality.
This view, as summarized by Milanovic (1998) and
Aghion and Commander (1999), has been challenged in an
important paper by Garner and Terrell (1998) who show
that, in the Czech and Slovak republics, there has been only
a moderate increase in inequality in the early years of
transition. More importantly, Garner and Terrell conclude
that government policies, in the form of social transfers,
signi cantly dampened the increase in inequality. By con-
trast, Commander and Lee (1998) present evidence showing
that social transfers may have actually exacerbated the rise
in inequality in the Russian transition.
In this paper, we provide new evidence that is relevant for
this debate from Poland, which is one of the more successful
transition countries. Using microdata from the Household
Budget Surveys (HBS) conducted by the Polish Central
Statistical Of ce (CSO), we examine the evolution of in-
come and consumption distributions in Poland over the
period 1985–1997. Our sample covers the  rst eight years of
the economic transition that began with the so-called “big
bang” reform of August 1989 to January 1990.1 Thus, we
are able to trace out the time path of income and consump-
tion inequality for an extended period both leading up to and
following the “big bang.” Although we highlight changes in
aggregate measures of inequality such as Gini coef cients
to compare our results with those for other countries, the
microdata enable us to provide a more detailed character-
ization of changes in Polish income and consumption dis-
tributions and over a longer period than any previous study
of transition economies.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom about the Polish
transition, we  nd no evidence that income and consump-
tion inequality increased in the early years of the transition.
In fact, our preferred estimate of the Gini coef cient for the
overall individual income distribution actually declined
from 0.256 in 1988 to 0.230 in 1992. It then began a gradual
increase, reaching levels comparable to the pretransition
period in 1994–1996 and then rising to 0.276 by 1997. To
put an increase of 0.020 in the income Gini coef cient in
perspective, it is only two-thirds as much as the increase
reported for the United States in the 1980s by Atkinson,
Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995). Viewed another way, it
still leaves Poland with a Gini value closer to those of
Scandinavian countries (around 0.25) than that of the United
States (0.41). (See World Bank (2000).)
However, we  nd that inequality in labor earnings in-
creased steadily and substantially during the transition pe-
riod of 1989–1997. In Poland, the increase in the Gini
coef cient for labor earnings (0.046) was more than twice
that of the Gini for overall income (0.020). Analysis of
individual earnings data, also from the HBS, indicates that
earnings differentials across education levels increased rap-
idly during the transition, re ecting sharp increases in edu-
cation premia. But the premium for labor market experience
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1 The communist government ended food price controls as it left power
in August 1989. The new Mazowiecki government implemented the
Balcerowicz plan in January 1990, and this ended price controls on most
products , leading to substantia l in ation and changes in relative prices.
Other aspects of the reforms, including reductions in state orders for
manufactured goods and restraints on credit for state-owned enterprises ,
along with external shocks such as increased import competition and the
collapse of the CMEA trade bloc, contributed to large declines in real GDP
(of 11.6% in 1990 and 7.0% in 1991, according to IMF estimates).
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fell sharply after the transition, and the position of older
workers deteriorated relative to younger workers, consistent
with the notion of rapid obsolescence of skills of older
workers in a period of massive industrial restructuring.
Furthermore, although we  nd no evidence of increases
in overall inequality, an analysis of the relative positions of
different socioeconomic groups indicates that there were
indeed winners and losers during transition. We  nd that
social transfers played a key role in between-group income
dynamics as well as in mitigating the increase in income
inequality, particularly in the early phase of transition. A
marked increase in the generosity of public sector pensions
in 1991 led to a substantial exit of older workers from the
labor force onto the pension rolls in 1991–1992 and im-
proved the relative income position of pensioner-headed
households. At the same time, other social transfers were
increased from 3% of GDP in 1989 to about 5% by 1992.
Together, these changes were suf cient to counteract the
increase in earnings inequality. As Dewatripont and Roland
(1996) point out, such increases in transfers can be ratio-
nalized as necessary to achieve initial political support for
the “big bang” reform strategy. From 1993 onward, growth
in transfers was halted and overall inequality began to rise
gradually.
A substantial proportion of transfers was in fact directed
not towards households at the bottom of the income distri-
bution but towards the middle class and, via the increased
generosity of pensions, to older workers who were poten-
tially big losers in terms of employment and earnings
prospects during the transition. Although transfers may not
have been well targeted from a welfare perspective, our
results suggest that, from a political economy perspective,
transfers may have been a critical component for ensuring
social stability and setting the stage for rapid reforms,
including enterprise restructuring, during the early years of
the transition.
In the  nal part of the paper, we also provide cross-
country evidence on inequality, social transfers, and growth
in the transition economies that is consistent with our
interpretation of the Polish experience. Across fourteen
countries for which we can observe Gini values both prior to
and several years after the start of the transition (that is, in
1988–1989 and 1995–1997), the mean increase in the Gini
is 0.095, which is several times larger than that observed in
Poland. In fact, Poland had the least growth in inequality
among these countries but also experienced the fastest
economic growth. We  nd that the correlation between
growth and changes in inequality in transition economies
has been strongly negative. This result holds up even when
we control for a number of key factors that may help to
explain growth, such as indicators of initial conditions and
measures of policy reforms aimed at market-oriented liber-
alization.
The relationship between growth and inequality has been
the subject of considerable debate in recent years. (See the
survey by Aghion, Caroli, and Garcõ´a-Pen˜alosa (1999).) A
traditional view is that higher inequality is associated with
higher rates of growth. Kuznets (1955) presented evidence
of a U-shaped relationship between inequality and per
capita GNP, which he interpreted as evidence that inequality
increases in the early stages of development and falls
thereafter.2 But a newer body of empirical work suggests a
negative correlation between inequality and subsequent eco-
nomic growth (Persson & Tabellini, 1994).3 Recent work in
growth theory has rationalized this  nding by showing that
redistributive transfers can enhance growth in an environ-
ment characterized by signi cant liquidity constraints.4
Also, in a political economy model, Alesina and Rodrik
(1994) show that income redistribution can enhance growth
by reducing political support for taxation of capital. And
Perotti (1996)  nds empirical support for the view that
redistribution can enhance growth by fostering sociopoliti-
cal stability.
The Polish experience is relevant to this literature on
inequality, redistribution, and growth. In Poland, social
(cash) transfers as a percent of GDP averaged 17.7% during
1990–1997, the highest level in any transition country. We
 nd that this high level of transfers helped Poland maintain
the smallest increase in inequality among the transition
economies. In fact, Gomuka (1998) refers to a “Polish
model” of transition “distinguished by an exceptionally
large volume of social transfers, especially . . . pensions”
that “helped to reduce the social cost of reform, but is
inhibiting Poland’s ability to sustain rapid growth” (p. 166).
This theme—that the level of transfers in Poland will hinder
future growth—has been sounded by many authors, includ-
ing OECD (1997), but such predictions have yet to be borne
out. In 1998–1999, Poland continued to experience more-
rapid growth than any of the other transition countries in our
sample.
Given recent developments in growth theory, it is intrigu-
ing to speculate that a high level of transfers may actually
have helped rather than hindered economic growth in Po-
land, especially in the early stages of transition. We con-
clude by presenting some suggestive cross-country evidence
indicating that the relationship between social transfers and
growth in transition economies has in fact been positive,
2 A standard argument is that inequality fosters growth in environment s
characterize d by liquidity constraints , because only wealthy individual s
can bear the sunk costs of starting industria l activities . Evans and Jo-
vanovic (1989) provide evidence that capital market constraint s affect the
decision to become an entrepreneur in the United States.
3 The evidence remains inconclusive , however. For instance, Forbes
(2000) reports a positive correlation between income inequality and
subsequent economic growth whereas Banerjee and Du o (2000)  nd no
relationship.
4 For instance, Galor and Zeira (1993) present a model with borrowing
constraints in which individual productivit y is a concave function of
human capital and show that redistributio n of wealth from the rich to the
poor enhances growth because the poor have a higher marginal produc-
tivity of investment . Related results have been obtained by Banerjee and
Newman (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997), and Benabou (1996).
INEQUALITY, TRANSFERS, AND GROWTH: NEW EVIDENCE FROM POLAND 325
which is similar to Perotti’s 1996  nding for a different and
larger sample of countries.
II. Review of Prior Research on Inequality in Poland
There exist a few other studies that have examined
income inequality in Poland during the transition, but they
report quite contradictory results (this despite the fact that
they all use income data derived from the HBS and look at
Gini coef cients for the individual income distribution,
assigning to each individual the per capita income for the
household in which he/she resides). For instance, based on
statistics computed by the CSO, OECD (1997, p. 86) reports
that the Gini for Poland was 0.25 in 1989, dropped to 0.23
in 1990, and then rose substantially to 0.26 in 1991 and to
0.29 by 1993. It then remained fairly stable in the 0.29–0.30
range through 1996. In contrast, Gorecki (1994) also  nds a
drop in inequality from 1989 to 1990, but  nds no evidence
of a subsequent increase in 1991. Milanovic (1999), using
published data on income deciles for years prior to 1993 and
the HBS microdata for 1993–1995, reports that the Gini fell
from 0.260 in 1989 to 0.247 in 1991. Like the OECD, he
reports a very large jump in the Gini in 1993 to 0.298. But,
in contrast to the OECD, his  gures suggest that the Gini
continued to rise very substantially after 1993, reaching
0.356 in 1995.5
To summarize, all three studies suggest that income
inequality declined from 1989 to 1990. The CSO-OECD
 gures imply a very large increase in income inequality in
1991, whereas the Milanovic and Gorecki  gures do not
show this. The CSO-OECD (1997) and Milanovic (1999)
 gures are consistent, however, in implying that large in-
creases in inequality occurred between 1992 and 1993. But
the CSO-OECD  gures indicate that inequality then stabi-
lized, whereas the Milanovic  gures imply that it grew
substantially again in 1994–1995.
What can account for this wide divergence in reported
results? A problem with these studies is that they do not use
the actual HBS microdata for the period prior to 1993.
Rather, for that period, the Gini values in these studies were
approximated using aggregate data on quantiles of the
income distribution published by the CSO in the annual
publication Budzety Gospodarstw Domowych. The accuracy
of these approximations is certainly an issue.
But a more serious problem is that, in 1993, the CSO
switched from quarterly to monthly data collection. Because
income is typically more variable at the monthly than the
quarterly frequency, this shift alone would have created a
substantial increase in cross-sectional income inequality and
in the Gini coef cient. We will argue that the switch to
monthly income reporting accounts for most of the increase
in inequality between 1992 and 1993 reported in both
OECD (1997) and Milanovic (1999). In the appendix, we
develop a technique for adjusting the 1993–1997 income
and consumption data for the increased variability that may
be attributable solely to the shift from quarterly to monthly
reporting.
Another potential problem with previous studies is that
the income statistics reported by the CSO, as well as those
reported by other former communist countries, differ in a
number of important ways from economically meaningful
measures of income. The of cial statistics appear to re ect
total revenues or “in ows” because they include loans,
dissaving, and cash holdings at the beginning of the survey
period. For farmers, income includes gross, rather than net,
farm revenues. This is an important issue as approximately
one- fth of Polish households are either farm households or
mixed worker-farmer households. Access to the microdata
enables us to make the necessary adjustments to obtain
more-meaningful measures of income (by excluding nonin-
come revenue items and by calculating net farm income) as
well as consumption.
In summary, our study is unique in that it is based on the
HBS microdata for a long sample period, extending from
 ve years prior to the “big bang” to eight years after. The
microdata enable use to make several improvements over
previous studies, including use of microdata for the pre-
1993 period, correction of the income and consumption
de nitions, and adjustment for the change in sampling
frame in 1993.
III. The Household Budget Surveys
The CSO has been collecting detailed microdata on
household income and consumption at least since 1978,
using fairly sophisticated sampling techniques. In the HBS,
the primary sampling unit is the household. A two-stage
geographically strati ed sampling scheme is used in which
the  rst-stage sampling units are the area survey units and
the second-stage units are individual households. In our
empirical work, we use sampling weights to maintain the
representativeness of the sample. Households were sur-
veyed for a full quarter (through 1992) or for a full month
(from 1993 onward) to monitor their income and spending
patterns. Supplementary information on household demo-
graphics, durable good holdings, and so on is collected from
the same households once every year. The typical sample
size is approximately 25,000 households per year. The CSO
uses the data obtained from these household surveys to
create aggregate tabulations that are then presented in their
monthly and annual statistical bulletins, or surveys.
5 Figures in European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2000)
are consisten t with the OECD  gures in that they imply that the Gini
plateaued around 0.30 from 1995 onward. World Bank (1999, 2000)
reports per capita income Ginis of 0.272 in 1992 and 0.329 in 1996. This
stands between the OECD and Milanovic (1999) calculation s in terms of
the rise in inequality over this period. Torrey, Smeeding, and Bailey
(1999), using a sample that constitutes about 45% of the full HBS sample
now available through the Luxembourg Income Survey (LIS) for selected
years, report income Ginis of 0.217 for 1987, 0.248 for 1990, and 0.243
for 1992. The LIS’s attempt to use a standardize d de nition of income
across country surveys could account for part of the difference between
their results and those of other authors and the CSO.
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The HBS contains detailed information on sources and
amounts of income for households as well as individuals
within each household. Total income is broken down into
four main categories: labor income (including wages, sala-
ries, and nonwage compensation), pensions, social bene ts
and other transfers, and other income. Social bene ts in-
clude income from unemployment bene ts that were intro-
duced in late 1989. A key point is that the data include
measures of the value of in-kind payments from employers
to workers, which have been an important part of workers’
compensation in Poland and other transition economies. For
farm households, farm income and expenditures, as well as
own consumption of the farm’s produce, are also reported.
There were no taxes on personal income until 1992. After
that year, we use net incomes in the analysis. The HBS also
contains detailed information on consumption. For this
study, we aggregate the consumption data and examine only
total and nondurables consumption.
In the immediate aftermath of the big bang, Poland
experienced rapid in ation and substantial relative price
changes. Using information from various CSO publications
and IMF data bases, we extracted quarterly and, for 1993–
1997, monthly time series on various aggregate and disag-
gregate price indices. For the results reported in this paper,
we used the aggregate CPI as the price de ator. Our ability
to match the frequency of the price data to the frequency of
the survey data on income and consumption is important in
the context of the large price changes that occurred during
the transition. We also experimented with using regional
and group-speci c price indices as well as disaggregated
price data that matched our disaggregated consumption data
(sixteen categories). These alternative price de ators made
little difference to our main results.
Two important changes were made to the HBS survey
design in 1993. We have already noted the change to
monthly income and consumption reporting. The other ma-
jor change was an attempt to obtain a more representative
sample of the self-employed. This group’s size is believed to
have increased markedly since the transition began. In the
next section, we examine the extent to which possible
underrepresentation of the self-employed in the HBS data
during the period 1990–1992 may have led to understate-
ment of the extent of inequality in those years.
Table 1 reports sample means for some of the variables
used extensively in our analysis of inequality.6 Two inter-
esting features are that the average share of income from
transfers and the share of pensioner-headed households
increase markedly after the transition. (We discuss this in
greater detail later.) The demographic characteristics of
households and household heads remain quite stable during
and after the transition. The means of the education dum-
mies indicate a small increase in average levels of educa-
tional attainment of household heads in the 1990s (a similar
increase occurs in the general population as well).
IV. Inequality
In this section, we examine various aspects of inequality
in Poland over the period 1985–1997. For the years 1993–
1997, we use the income and consumption measures that are
adjusted (using the procedure described in the appendix) for
the increase in idiosyncratic variance that occurred with the
shift to a monthly reporting period. The measures of in-
equality we examine are based on the distribution of indi-
vidual income or consumption, unless explicitly noted oth-
erwise. A key issue in inequality measurement is how to
account for household composition and economies of scale
when measuring household well-being or when assigning
individual income or consumption levels to household
members. Most prior studies of income inequality in Poland
and other transition economies have simply assigned the per
capita household income to each member of a household
prior to measuring inequality in individual income.7
In an earlier paper (Keane & Prasad, 1999), we con-
structed food share (FS)-based equivalence scales for Po-
land using the Engel (1895) method, which assumes that
two households with different demographic composition are
equally well off at income levels that enable them to have
equal food shares (ratio of expenditure on food to total
expenditure on nondurables). The estimated equivalence
scales exhibited somewhat greater household economies of
scale than those typically used for western countries. We
next report our key results based on a number of alternative
equivalence scales to ensure that our results are not sensitive
to the choice of scale. Besides our own FS scale, we also use
the OECD scale, the McClements (1977) scale (commonly
used in Britain), and the simple per capita scale. Appendix
table A1 shows values of these equivalence scales for a
representative set of household types.
A. Measures of Overall Inequality
We  rst examine the evolution of summary measures of
overall inequality. In all cases, we examine the distribution
of individual income (or consumption), assigning to each
individual the per equivalent (or per capita) income for the
household in which the person resides. Table 2 reports Gini
coef cients based on per capita incomes and incomes ad-
justed by the FS equivalence scale. The results in this table
highlight the importance of adjusting for the change in
survey frequency in 1993. Without this adjustment, for
instance, the increase in the per capita income Gini from
6 Note that the sample size falls in 1992. In that year, half of the total
sample was used to test the new monthly survey; these data were
considered unreliable and not made available to us.
7 One exception is the paper by Garner and Terrell (1998) that uses
equivalence scales. To the extent that there are household economies of
scale, using per capita household income will exaggerate the well-being of
people in smaller households , and, to the extent that adults have greater
expenses than do children, use of per capita income will understate the
well-being of people in households with many children.
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1992 to 1993 is 0.045, which is far larger than the estimated
increase of 0.021 that we obtain using the adjusted data.
Similarly, without the adjustment, the Ginis based on the FS
equivalence scale would markedly overstate the increase in
inequality that occurred between 1992 and 1993 (that is, a
Gini increase of 0.046 versus 0.018). We use adjusted
income and consumption measures for 1993–1997 in all of
the remaining analysis.
In table 2, we also examine the Ginis with adjusted
income but excluding the self-employed in 1993–1996. The
inclusion of the self-employed makes only a small difference
to either set of Ginis and suggests that underrepresentation of
TABLE 1.—SAMPLE MEANS FOR SELECTED YEARS
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1995 1997
Real household income (shares)
Labor income 0.52 0.53 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.56
Transfers 0.23 0.22 0.26 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.32
Farm income 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.08
Other income 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05
Real household consumption (shares)
Durables 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10
Nondurables 0.87 0.86 0.89 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.90
Food 0.45 0.46 0.53 0.47 0.44 0.43 0.41 0.38
Household characteristics
Urban 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.64 0.66 0.65 0.67
Number of persons in household 3.27 3.27 3.24 3.16 3.14 3.15 3.18 3.12
Primary income source of household
Workers 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.50 0.49 0.44 0.42 0.42
Farmers 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.06
Mixed, worker-farmers 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Pensioners, others 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.40
Self-employed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.05 0.06 0.06
Household head characteristics
Male, 18–30 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11
Male, 31–60 0.58 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.59 0.58
Male, .60 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13
Female, 18–30 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Female, 31–60 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Female, .60 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08
Age 47.54 47.78 47.90 48.30 48.45 47.96 48.03 48.09
College degree 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09
Some college 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
High school 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.26
Some high school 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 . . . . . . . . .
Basic vocational training 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.35
Primary school 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.25
Primary school not completed 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02
Number of observations (households)
1985 21,560 1989 29,366 1992 10,642 1995 31,874
1986 25,475 1990 29,148 1993 31,966 1996 31,782
1987 29,510 1991 28,632 1994 31,942 1997 31,659
1988 29,287
The components of income and consumption are shown as (mean) shares of total income and consumption, respectively.
TABLE 2.—EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN SURVEY IN 1993 ON GINI COEFFICIENTS FOR INCOME
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Per Capita Income Ginis
Baseline 0.270 0.274 0.270 0.272 0.278 0.271 0.266 0.264 0.285 0.298 0.294 0.301 0.319
Alternative Ginis for 1993–1997
Without residual adjustment 0.309 0.323 0.318 0.327 0.339
Excluding self-employed 0.283 0.295 0.291 0.299 0.316
Food-Share Based Equivalence Scale
Baseline 0.252 0.254 0.246 0.256 0.263 0.250 0.235 0.230 0.248 0.262 0.255 0.265 0.276
Alternative Ginis for 1993–1997
Without residual adjustment 0.276 0.292 0.284 0.296 0.304
Excluding self-employed 0.243 0.257 0.250 0.261 0.274
The baseline Ginis include the self-employed (whose representation in the sample was increased in 1993) and incorporate adjustments for the change in survey frequency (from quarterly to monthly) in 1993.
The procedure for adjusting the income data for 1993–1997 is described in the appendix.
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the self-employed in 1990–1992 is unlikely to have resulted
in a signi cant downward bias in Gini coef cients for those
years.8 Henceforth, we focus on results including the self-
employed, recognizing that this generates a bit of a spurious
jump in inequality in 1992–1993 due to the slight change in
sample composition.
Table 3  rst reports Gini coef cients based on four
alternative equivalence scales. Note that the three scales that
account for household economies of scale (FS, Mc-
Clements, and OECD) produce very similar Ginis, typically
differing only in the third decimal place. The Ginis based on
all four scales indicate that inequality increased in 1989
compared to the level in 1985–1988, but that inequality
returned to pretransition levels in 1990, and continued to
decline in 1991–1992. The Gini based on the FS scale
shows the sharpest decline in inequality in 1989–1992 (from
0.263 to 0.230), and the Gini based on per capita income
shows the smallest decline (from 0.278 to 0.264), but Ginis
based on all four scales exhibit the same basic pattern.
In short, inequality spiked in the immediate aftermath of
the big bang but, by 1992, it was no higher than the levels
seen before the transition. Starting in 1993, however, in-
equality begins to rise and, by 1997, is at a level higher than
the peak attained in 1989. This pattern is robust to the
choice of equivalence scale. It is important to note, how-
ever, that the increase in inequality even by 1997 is hardly
dramatic. For example, the Gini based on the FS equiva-
lence scale rises from 0.256 in 1988 (the year before the
transition) to 0.276 in 1997. This increase of 0.020 is
smaller than the increase of 0.03 reported for the United
States in the 1980s by Atkinson et al. (1995), or the increase
from 0.326 to 0.361 reported for the United Kingdom from
1986 to 1991 in World Bank (1999, 2000).
All of our Gini coef cients, regardless of the equivalence
scale used, imply a much smaller increase in inequality than
that implied by of cial CSO-OECD (1997)  gures for
1989–1996 on which the conventional wisdom about the
sharp increase in inequality after the transition appear to be
based. Those  gures imply that the Gini coef cient for per
capita income rose from 0.249 in 1989 to 0.290 in 1993. In
the same period, our per capita Ginis are rather  at, rising
only from 0.278 to 0.282. For 1996, the OECD reports a
Gini value of 0.300 whereas our value is 0.301. During
1989–1996 (the longest period for which we can compare
results), the OECD  gures imply an increase of 0.051
whereas our  gures imply an increase of only 0.023. Thus,
the OECD  gures imply an increase in inequality in Poland
8 Because this group covers household heads engaged in a wide variety
of businesses , households in this group do not systematicall y have higher
income levels than the sample averages . In fact, the distribution of income
among the self-employed is just slightly more unequal than for the general
population.
TABLE 3.—POLAND: MEASURES OF INEQUALITY, 1985–1997
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Gini Coef cients
Total income
Food-share based eqv. scale 0.252 0.254 0.246 0.256 0.263 0.250 0.235 0.230 0.248 0.262 0.255 0.265 0.276
McClements equivalence scale 0.249 0.253 0.246 0.254 0.261 0.249 0.238 0.234 0.253 0.266 0.259 0.270 0.282
OECD equivalence scale 0.253 0.257 0.250 0.256 0.264 0.253 0.242 0.238 0.257 0.271 0.264 0.275 0.286
Per capita 0.270 0.274 0.270 0.272 0.278 0.271 0.266 0.264 0.285 0.298 0.294 0.301 0.319
Income excluding transfers 0.373 0.375 0.368 0.385 0.384 0.389 0.404 0.416 0.416 0.437 0.432 0.448 0.451
Nondurables consumption
Food-share based eqv. scale 0.196 0.200 0.205 0.211 0.219 0.209 0.208 0.205 0.222 0.228 0.222 0.227 0.235
McClements equivalence scale 0.197 0.202 0.208 0.214 0.220 0.210 0.213 0.212 0.229 0.234 0.229 0.233 0.242
OECD equivalence scale 0.200 0.207 0.212 0.217 0.224 0.214 0.218 0.217 0.234 0.239 0.234 0.239 0.247
Per capita 0.222 0.229 0.236 0.239 0.242 0.235 0.245 0.249 0.262 0.268 0.264 0.268 0.277
Total consumption 0.230 0.234 0.239 0.244 0.258 0.241 0.233 0.227 0.247 0.254 0.247 0.262 0.271
Half the Square of the Coef cient of Variation
Total income 0.085 0.090 0.085 0.091 0.105 0.086 0.079 0.077 0.097 0.103 0.096 0.105 0.112
Nondurables consumption 0.066 0.068 0.070 0.074 0.081 0.068 0.072 0.068 0.088 0.093 0.085 0.091 0.099
Income excluding transfers 0.184 0.190 0.186 0.203 0.210 0.207 0.230 0.244 0.265 0.281 0.278 0.294 0.306
Mean Log Deviation
Total income 0.075 0.079 0.077 0.078 0.087 0.075 0.071 0.069 0.079 0.086 0.081 0.086 0.093
Nondurables consumption 0.060 0.062 0.064 0.067 0.074 0.062 0.064 0.064 0.067 0.064 0.056 0.055 0.082
Income excluding transfers 0.224 0.214 0.213 0.221 0.244 0.247 0.268 0.278 0.404 0.357 0.333 0.317 0.444
Within-Group Gini Coef cients
Workers 0.186 0.192 0.191 0.189 0.208 0.211 0.208 0.211 0.222 0.234 0.228 0.240 0.248
Farmers 0.475 0.483 0.478 0.496 0.440 0.420 0.366 0.321 0.313 0.362 0.341 0.366 0.414
Mixed, worker-farmers 0.272 0.279 0.276 0.285 0.271 0.253 0.229 0.220 0.223 0.234 0.244 0.252 0.267
Pensioners, other 0.211 0.212 0.203 0.205 0.214 0.206 0.210 0.203 0.225 0.231 0.226 0.228 0.240
Workers (labor income only) 0.237 0.243 0.240 0.252 0.262 0.268 0.278 0.289 0.285 0.292 0.288 0.295 0.298
The inequality measures shown here are for the individua l distributions of income and consumption . Household income and consumption are adjusted using the food share-based equivalence scale (unless indicated
otherwise) and allocated equally to individuals in the household. Income and consumption data for 1993–1997 are adjusted for the change in survey frequency.
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during the transition that is very large by historical stan-
dards, but our  gures imply an increase that is substantially
smaller.9 Furthermore, our results using the FS scale, which
we consider more reliable, imply essentially no increase in
inequality over the 1989–1996 period (that is, the Gini
changes from 0.263 to 0.265).
We also examined inequality based on income net of
transfers (table 3, row 5).10 Interestingly, this reveals a very
different picture. The Gini coef cient for income excluding
transfers increased by 0.066 from 1988 to 1997, more than
three times the increase in the Gini for overall income.
Thus, it appears that transfers played a crucial role in
inequality dynamics after the transition. (We later investi-
gate this in greater detail.)
Rows 6 through 10 of table 3 report results for consump-
tion inequality (using, as noted earlier, adjusted consump-
tion data for 1993–1997). Consumption is a better measure
of welfare than income, particularly as measures based on
income could overstate inequality because they may re ect
idiosyncratic income shocks that could be smoothed by
households. As expected, the Gini coef cients for nondura-
bles consumption are lower than those for income. Never-
theless, independent of the choice of equivalent scale, they
show a pattern of changes in inequality almost identical to
that based on income. Using total consumption reveals a
similar picture.
To examine whether our main results were sensitive to
the choice of inequality measure, we also computed two
other scalar measures of inequality: the mean log deviation
(MLD) and a monotonoic transform of the coef cient of
variation (CV). We report these inequality measures in the
middle panels of table 3 to determine if they tell a consistent
story. In fact, they do. When we use either income or
nondurables consumption, these measures also show an
upward spike in 1989, followed by a decline in 1990–1992
to below the pretransition level, and a subsequent steady
increase in 1993–1997 to a level modestly above that in the
pretransition period.
All three measures of inequality—the Gini coef cient,
CV, and MLD—show far greater increases in inequality
when we look at income net of transfers rather than total
income. This pattern is particularly interesting in the case of
the CV measure, which is most sensitive to changes at the
high end of the distribution. This result stems from the fact
that transfers in Poland are focused not only at the low end
of the income distribution but extend well into the high end.
(We give more details on the targeting of transfers.)
To summarize, we  nd no evidence to support the view,
based on of cial statistics, of a sharp increase in total
income inequality following the transition in Poland. Our
results also differ markedly from the OECD-CSO  gures in
terms of the timing of changes in inequality. Those  gures
imply that inequality grew tremendously from 1989 to
1993, and that it then stayed rather  at through 1996. Our
results indicate that inequality actually fell from 1989–
1992, but we  nd that inequality rose noticeably after 1993
and, especially, in 1996 and 1997. Thus, we  nd that most
of the increase in inequality occurred several years after the
big bang, and long after the OECD-CSO  gures imply the
increase had already ceased.
This difference in timing has important implications for
the interpretation of what occurred during the transition.
The OECD-CSO  gures for Poland and comparable  gures
for other transition economies (Milanovic, 1999) are often
viewed as evidence that marked increases in inequality are
an inevitable concomitant of the process of transition to a
market economy. Our results, however, indicate that the
changes in inequality during the  rst seven years of the
transition in Poland were quite modest. Thus, our results
suggest that changes in inequality during transition may not
be inevitable but, rather, may result from particular policy
choices. Later in the paper, we discuss in more detail the
role of social transfer policies in inequality dynamics.
Because our results concerning the evolution of inequal-
ity over time were not sensitive to the choice of a particular
equivalence scale, we use only the FS scale in all further
analysis.11
B. Quantile Ratios
In this section, we examine income inequality by looking
at quantile ratios. Unlike the scalar inequality measures
considered thus far, this allows us to consider changes in
inequality in different parts of the distribution. Figure 1
plots the 90-10 and 75-25 quantile ratios for each year over
the sample period. The quantiles for individuals were cal-
culated using real household income and nondurable con-
sumption, both adjusted using the FS equivalence scale. The
quantile ratios reveal some interesting patterns. After a brief
spike in 1989, the 90-10 quantile ratio falls back to its
pretransition level before gradually increasing in the mid-
1990s. However, note that the cumulative increase in the
90-10 ratio from the period 1985–1988 through 1997 is only
about 0.20, which is hardly a substantial increase. To put
this in perspective, Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) report
9 Note that, in the 1990s, our Ginis are closer to those computed by the
CSO. In Keane and Prasad (2001), we describe a detailed attempt we
made to reconcile our Gini coef cients for earlier years with the CSO-
OECD  gures, which are also purportedly based on the HBS data. The
difference s can, to a large extent, be attributed to (i) the CSO’s use of
“revenues” rather than incomes in earlier years, (ii) use of grouped data in
calculating Ginis (in the 1980s, tabulated decile groups were used, with all
individuals in a given decile group being ascribed the mean income level
within that decile; in recent years, percentile groups have been used), and
(iii) the apparent inconsisten t use of equivalence scales over time (this is
based on private correspondenc e with the CSO).
10 Because transfers tend to be stable over time, the adjustment factors
(to adjust for the change in survey frequency in 1993) for income net of
transfers were nearly identical to those we computed for income including
transfers.
11 We recomputed many of the later results in the paper using different
equivalence scales. Although the levels of inequality were slightly affected
by the choice of equivalence scale, as is the case in table 3, patterns of the
evolution of inequality over time were robust to this choice.
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a much greater increase of 1.04 (from 4.75 to 5.79) in the
90-10 ratio for the United States from 1980 to 1990. The
90-10 ratio for consumption follows a pattern very similar
to that of the income ratio over the period 1988–1997
(although, for reasons that are not clear, it exhibits an
upward trend prior to the transition). The 75-25 quantile
ratios for income and consumption are essentially un-
changed over the sample period, indicating even greater
stability in the middle part of these distributions. We also
examined  ner breakdowns of the 90-10 and 75-25 quantile
ratios (for example, the 90-50 and 50-10 quantiles ratios)
and found that inequality was equally distributed above and
below the median and that there were no signi cant changes
in patterns of inequality that could be detected using these
 ner breakdowns of the data.
C. Kernel Density Estimates of Income and Consumption
Distributions
To obtain a visual representation of changes in the shape
and features of the entire distribution, we now examine
kernel density estimates of household income and consump-
tion distributions. Figure 2 (top panel) presents kernel den-
sity estimates for real household income for the years 1988,
1992, 1993, and 1995.12 The density is calculated at the
same 200 income points for all four years, and the  rst 125
are plotted in the  gure. This covers at least 98% of the
households in all four years. Figure 4 (lower panel) also
contains kernel density estimates for real household nondu-
rable consumption for the same four years. Re ecting the
more compact distribution of consumption, the  rst 75
points cover more than 99% of the households.
The change in the shape of the densities between the year
1988 and selected years after the big bang is striking. Much
of the change simply re ects the decline in mean income
and consumption following the big bang. However, the
change in shape observed in  gure 2 is not due simply to a
contraction of the mean. To see this, consider taking the
distribution for 1991 and multiplying all of the income
 gures by the ratio of mean income in 1988 to that in 1991.
Such a transformation will preserve relative inequality mea-
sures, while equating mean income in 1991 with that in
1988. This enables us to directly compare the shapes of the
distributions, abstracting from mean differences. The 1988
income density and the transformed densities for 1991 and
also for 1995 are plotted together in  gure 3 (the vertical
lines indicate the mean).
The most prominent features of  gure 3 are that, in
moving from 1988 to 1991, the mass in the left tail is
reduced, and the distribution becomes more peaked around
the mode. This accounts for the declines in the Gini mea-
sures noted previously. A key aspect of what happened
during the transition becomes apparent if one compares the
top panels of  gures 2 and 3. In  gure 2, we see that, as the
overall income distribution shifted left, there was a support
area at about 34,000 to 58,000 zlotys (prices indexed to 100
in 1992Q4) below which household income tended not to
fall. Because of the drop in mean real income from 1988 to
1991, the ratio of this support level to mean income in-
creased. In  gure 3, this has the effect of shifting to the right
the fat part of the left tail of the scale-adjusted income
distribution.
We investigated the income sources of households with
real income in the 34,000–58,000 zloty range, and found
that these households receive more than 80% of their
income from pensions (80.5% in 1988 and 82.2% in 1991).
These percentages drop off quickly as household income
rises above the 58,000 zloty level. The percentage of total
household income for all households coming from pensions
was 16.8% in 1988 and 26.8% in 1991. Thus, the house-
holds with income in the support area of about 34,000–
58,000 zlotys got a far higher share of income from pen-
sions than did the typical household. Furthermore, it is
important to note that, although mean real household in-
come fell from 178,969 zloty in 1988 to 131,563 zloty in
12 An Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 4,000 was used for the
kernel density estimation. No adjustment was made for household size.
FIGURE 1.—INCOME AND CONSUMPTION QUANTILE RATIOS
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1991, the mean real pension actually rose from 29,811 to
35,258. This resulted from legislation that took effect in
1991 that made pensions substantially more generous.
Hence, it is clear from our results that the new pension law
helped shift the fat part of the left tail of the income
distribution to the right and that this contributed importantly
to the reductions in inequality measures that we have
noted.13 The lower panel of  gure 3, which compares the
adjusted distributions for 1991 and 1995, shows that this
effect was further accentuated through 1995.
D. Between- and Within-Group Changes in Inequality
We have found no evidence of an increase in overall
inequality in Poland in the immediate aftermath of the big
bang, regardless of which of several inequality measures we
consider. However, this does not mean that there were no
winners and losers in the transition.
Figure 4 shows how median income and consumption
evolved for four types of households differentiated by main
income source of the household head: workers, farmers,
mixed worker-farmers, and pensioners. A notable feature of
the results is that the use of equivalence scales is important.
The per capita household income and consumption plots in
the top panel suggest that pensioner-headed households
moved from a middle position to being clearly better off
13 It is also worth noting that the fraction of households headed by
pensioners (and other social bene t recipients ) increased from about 28%
in the 1985–1989 period to 36% in 1992. Opting for the more-generou s
pensions was apparently an attractive option for workers who did not fare
well in the transition . We return to this issue later.
FIGURE 2.—KERNEL DENSITY ESTIMATES
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than other households after the big bang. But the per
equivalent unit results in the lower panels tell a very
different story.14 They indicate that pensioner-headed house-
holds had much lower median income and consumption
than other groups during the 1985–1989 period, and that
their relative position improved dramatically after the big
bang so as to bring their income and consumption up to
almost the same level as the next-lowest group (farmers). As
a result, we  nd that pensions contributed importantly to a
reduction in inequality.15 The main impetus behind the
improved relative position of pensioners was a substantial
increase in pension levels that took place in 1991. In fact, by
1997, the relative position of pensioner-headed households
is inferior only to that of worker-headed households.
We also examined the fractions of households that fall in
each quintile of the income distribution, conditional on
education or age of the household head (results not shown
here). One main  nding was the substantial improvement in
the relative positions of households whose heads have
14 The reason for the difference in the scales is that the mean numbers of
persons in worker, farmer, worker-farmer, and pensioner households are
3.59, 3.64, 4.55, and 1.88, respectivel y, whereas the mean numbers of
equivalen t units are 1.69, 1.77, 2.08, and 1.19, respectivel y.
15 This is similar to Garner and Terrell’s 1998  nding that pensions
substantiall y reduced inequality (as measured by income Gini coef cients)
during the early transition years in the Czech and Slovak republics .
FIGURE 3.—KERNEL DENSITY ESTIMATES: ADJ. INCOME
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higher educational quali cations. Another striking result
was the improvement of conditions for the old, which
resulted from more-generous pensions. Among households
in which the head was more than sixty years old, 39.2%
were in the bottom quintile in 1989, but this dropped to only
24.3% by 1992. In contrast, the probabilities that a house-
hold with a young (18–30) or middle-aged (31–60) head
would fall in the bottom quintile of the income distribution
increased over the same period.
Next, we examined the evolution of within-group in-
equality, which turns out to be very different across different
groups. The bottom panel of table 3 shows Gini coef cients
estimated separately for each group. These indicate a steady
rise in inequality for individuals in worker-headed house-
holds, from 0.189 in 1988 to 0.248 in 1997. This increase of
0.059 in the Gini for individuals in these households is
almost three times as great as the 0.020 increase in the Gini
for the overall income distribution. Within-group inequality
actually fell among farmer and mixed worker-farmer house-
holds during the transition. There was also a modest in-
crease in inequality within pensioner-headed households.
The most striking result here is the signi cant and steady
increase in inequality among worker-headed households
after 1988. The bottom row of table 3 reveals that much of
the increase in income inequality among worker-headed
households can be attributed to increased inequality in labor
income. When we look at labor income alone, the Gini for
this group increased from 0.252 in 1988 to 0.298 in 1997, an
increase of 0.046. Thus, we see that inequality in labor
earnings grew substantially more than inequality in the
overall income distribution.
E. Earnings Inequality
To gain more insight into the sources of changes in labor
earnings inequality, we also examined the evolution of
earnings for individual workers using data available in the
HBS. We analyzed changes in the wage structure using OLS
and quantile regression techniques. To conserve space, we
do not present those results here but only brie y summarize
the main  ndings that are relevant to this paper. (See Keane
and Prasad (2002, forthcoming) for detailed results.)
The most prominent result in the wage regressions was
the sharp increase in education premia after the transition.
Estimates of standard human capital earnings functions
indicated that the earnings premium for a college degree
relative to a primary school degree increased from 47% in
1988 to 98% in 1996. The high school premium increased
from 23% to 41% over the same period. Our  nding of a
sharp increase in education premia after the transition is
FIGURE 4.—MEDIAN INCOME, CONSUMPTION FOR DIFFERENT SOCIOECONOMIC GROUPS
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consistent with that of Gorecki (1994), based on his exam-
ination of aggregate Polish wage data, and of authors who
have examined the wage structure in other transition econ-
omies. (See, for example, Ham, Svejnar, and Terrell (1995)
for evidence from Czechoslovakia, and Brainerd (1998) for
evidence from Russia.)
The other main result in our wage regressions was that
experience premia are estimated to have declined sharply in
the early years of the transition. These declines were quite
large at all quantile points of the distribution that we
examined and were especially sharp for older workers.16
There was a slight recovery in experience premia in 1994–
1996; this recovery was greater for older workers while, for
younger and middle-aged workers, experience premia re-
main below their pretransition levels even by 1996.
These results indicate that the returns to general human
capital, re ected in education premia, rose markedly after
the transition, whereas the returns to experience, especially
for older workers, declined sharply in the early years of the
transition. This is consistent with the notion of rapid obso-
lescence of  rm- or industry-speci c skills during a period
of rapid technological change and industrial restructuring
(Svejnar, 1996). Workers with higher levels of general
human capital are better able to adapt to such changes, but
older workers, who typically have higher levels of  rm- or
industry-speci c human capital, face a sharp decline in their
earnings potential. This, combined with the increased gen-
erosity of pensions, explains the surge in the number of
pensioner-headed households in 1991–1992 that we noted
in table 1. Indeed, self-selection into retirement probably
accounts for the recovery in experience premia for older
workers that occurred after 1992 because a large number of
older workers, particularly in the 55–65 age bracket, retired
in 1991–1992. The patterns of changes in earnings inequal-
ity that we have discussed here have important implications
for understanding key aspects of the political economy of
the transition process. This is the subject of the next section.
V. The Targeting of Transfers:
A Political Economy Perspective
The analysis thus far has indicated that, although inequal-
ity in labor earnings did increase substantially among work-
ers and worker-headed households, the overall rise in in-
come inequality during the transition was quite effectively
dampened by social transfer mechanisms. In this section, we
provide a more detailed examination of the targeting of
transfers.
We  rst focus on pensions because they constitute a very
important transfer mechanism in Poland. Pension expendi-
tures and the size of the pension rolls increased enormously
in the early years of the transition. As shown in table 4,
public expenditure  gures indicate that total public pension
expenditure as a percent of GDP rose from 8% in 1989–
1990 to almost 15% by 1992. The HBS data indicate a
similar pattern, with the share of total income accounted for
by pensions rising from 16% in 1989 to 25% in 1992. This
is particularly interesting given the results from our wage
regressions that showed a substantial decline in experience
premia for older workers. Our view is that older workers
who were adversely affected by the transition were cush-
ioned by increasing the generosity of the pensions. Indeed,
the replacement rate (average pension as a ratio of the
average wage) rose from about 52% in 1988–1989 to 65%
in 1991 and remained above 60% through 1997 (OECD,
1998).
Furthermore, because older workers had the most to lose
from the privatization or closure of existing state-owned
 rms, giving them the option of moving onto the pension
rolls may have been a key factor in removing a potential
political obstacle to enterprise restructuring and privatiza-
tion. This option, re ected in a relaxation of the pension
eligibility requirements in 1990–1991, was indeed exercised
16 Rutkowski (1997) and Lehmann and Wadsworth (2000) report similar
 ndings for Poland and other transition economies.
TABLE 4.—SOCIAL TRANSFERS
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
General Government Expenditures
(in percentage of GDP)
Cash transfers to individuals 9.4 11.2 10.6 17.3 19.9 20.4 20.2 19.7 18.7 19.4
Pensions 7.1 8.2 8.1 12.2 14.8 15.0 14.9 14.5 14.3 14.4
Unemployment bene ts 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.2 1.7 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0
Other bene ts 2.3 3.0 2.3 3.9 3.4 4.2 4.1 4.0 3.3 4.0
Mean Cash Transfers (HBS data)
Total transfers 41154 41792 36254 44948 44694 43486 44171 44860 46786 48197
(average ratio to total income) (23.4) (21.8) (26.3) (32.2) (33.6) (31.6) (32.8) (32.7) (32.4) (31.3)
Pensions 29857 30497 27307 33520 33346 33172 34672 36240 38008 40715
(average ratio to total income) (17.0) (15.9) (19.8) (24.0) (25.1) (24.1) (25.8) (26.4) (26.3) (26.4)
Other cash bene ts (incl. UI) 11280 11279 8927 11404 11323 10315 9498 8620 8777 7482
(average ratio to total income) (6.4) (5.9) (6.5) (8.2) (8.5) (7.5) (7.1) (6.3) (6.1) (4.9)
General Government Balance
(in percentage of GDP) 0.0 27.4 3.1 26.5 26.7 22.9 23.0 23.1 23.4 23.1
Real GDP (annual % change) 4.0 0.3 211.6 27.0 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 6.1 6.9
The data on real GDP and government expenditures are taken from various IMF sources. The  gures in the middle panel (mean transfers in HBS data) are expressed in terms of 1992Q4 prices.
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by a large number of workers, resulting in an increase in the
number of newly granted pensions from about 0.6 million
per year in 1988–1989 to almost 1.4 million in 1991
(OECD, 1998, p. 65). Consistent with this result, we  nd
that, in the HBS data, among households headed by a person
in the 55–65 age range, the share of labor income in total
income declined from 24% in 1989 to 12% by 1994, before
recovering somewhat to 16% by 1997. In these years, the
share of pension income in total income for these house-
holds was 64%, 74%, and 73%, respectively.17
Next, we look at social transfers as a whole. We analyzed
the targeting of transfers by comparing shares of income,
with and without transfers, going to different quintiles of the
respective distributions and also by running nonparametric
regressions of transfers on income net of transfers. This
analysis revealed that, during the transition, substantial
transfers were made to households around and above the
median of the distribution. From a static welfare perspec-
tive, this suggests that transfers could have been better
targeted if the objective was to redistribute income to
households near the bottom of the distribution of pretransfer
income. However, because individuals in the middle class
tend to have a signi cantly higher propensity to vote than do
individuals at lower income levels, transfers targeted in this
manner may have been more effective at “buying” the social
stability that characterized the transition period, notwith-
standing the potentially disruptive effects of the economic
transformation. (See Roland (1997) for a related analysis.)
Thus, transfers may have contributed not only to social
stability but also to ensuring the conditions necessary for
reforms such as privatization and enterprise restructuring
that paved the way for high growth. As shown in table 4,
this resulted in a substantial increase in the general govern-
ment budget de cit in the early years of the transition.
Although there was an attempt to hold the line on transfers
in 1990, the increased generosity of pensions and other
social bene ts led to a mushrooming of the de cit in
1991–1992. This proved unsustainable, and, by 1993,
growth in transfer expenditures (as a percentage of GDP)
had been halted, although pensions and other social bene ts
were at a higher level than in the pretransition years. The
increase in aggregate inequality after 1993 is yet another
indicator of how important the growth in transfers was in
dampening the rise in overall inequality in the early years of
the transition.
To summarize, the analysis in this paper highlights the
role of policy choices, as embodied in transfer and other
policies, on the dynamics of inequality during the transition
to a market economy. In particular, we have argued that the
increase in transfer expenditures during the critical early
years of the transition may have played an important role in
setting the stage for the successful economic transition in
Poland.
VI. Inequality, Transfers, and Growth:
Some Cross-Country Evidence
Our detailed analysis of the Polish transition experience
has suggested that, from a political economy perspective,
the use of transfer mechanisms to mitigate the potential rise
in inequality during the transition to a market economy may
have important implications for the success of the transition
process. In this section, we expand our analysis to provide
a cross-country perspective on the experiences of the tran-
sition economies of Eastern Europe in terms of inequality,
social transfers, and growth.
A prerequisite for the investigation is that we have avail-
able for each country two measures of income inequality:
one for a year prior to the start of the transition and a second
for a year several years after the start of the transition (so
that the data do not simply capture the effects of the initial
phase of transition on inequality). It is also important that
the pre- and posttransition Gini values for each country be
based on similar measures of income, similar sampling time
frames, similar data sets, and so on so that the measures are
reasonably comparable. Table 5 reports pre- and posttransi-
tion Gini values, obtained from six different sources that we
believe reasonably satisfy these comparability criteria. The
sources are Milanovic (1998, 1999), World Bank (1997,
1999, 2000), and OECD (1997).
The Gini coef cients in table 5 are all for the respective
individual income distributions, assigning to each individ-
ual the per capita income of the household.18 We have
argued earlier that it would be more reasonable to use
equivalence scales to accommodate household economies
of scale. But only per capita income Ginis are available for
most transition economies. Ginis based on labor earnings
are available for more countries, but these would not ac-
count for the effect of transfers on the distribution of total
income, which is our focus. Some omissions from the table
are noteworthy. We require that posttransition Gini values
be in the 1995–1997 period. As a result, we could not obtain
posttransition values for the Slovak Republic, Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan, and Moldova. Gini values for these countries
are constructed by Milanovic (1998) for 1993, but this is too
soon after the start of the transition for our purposes.
Table 5 reports annualized cumulative GDP growth in the
 rst eight years of transition. This corresponds to the 1990–
17 Among households with heads in the 45–55 age range and in lower
age ranges, there was a small drop from 1989 to 1992 in the share of
income from labor income, but this was mostly offset by an increase in
other social bene ts rather than pensions . Among households with heads
aged 65 and older, pensions constitute 85%–90% of total income, with
labor income accounting for barely 2%.
18 There were  ve cases in which we had Ginis for both 1988 and 1989
and two cases (besides Poland) in which we had Ginis for both 1995 and
1996. In the former cases, we took 1988 (the earlier year), and in the latter
cases we took 1996 (the later year). Also note that the posttransitio n Gini
values for Lithuania and Kazakhstan are for consumption rather than
income. This probably understate s the increase in income inequality in
these countries . Because these countries also had poor growth perfor-
mance, the effect is, if anything, to understate the negative correlation
between GDP growth and changes in inequality that we  nd later.
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1997 period for all Eastern European countries except
Romania, 1991–1998 for Romania, and 1992–1999 for
Russia and the other former Soviet Union countries. The
table also reports the mean level of social (cash) transfers, as
a percentage of GDP, from the  rst year of the transition
through 1997. Note that Poland and Slovenia are the only
countries that surpassed pretransition levels of GDP after
eight years. These countries also have among the highest
average levels of social transfers (17.7% of GDP for Poland
and 14.8% for Slovenia).
Finally, table 5 also reports two variables that could be
relevant for explaining the different growth experiences of
the transition economies. The  rst is a summary measure of
the EBRD transition indicators for each country, taken from
the EBRD’s 1995 Transition Report. This is a measure of
government policies in terms of the degree of transition
towards a market economy framework.19 The second vari-
able is a measure of the initial conditions facing each
country at the start of the transition. This variable, taken
from de Melo, Denizer, Gelb, and Tenev (1997, henceforth
MDGT), is constructed using factor analysis and is based on
the degree of industrialization, extent of initial macroeco-
nomic imbalances, geographic orientation of trade, and
length of time under communism. We report the  rst com-
mon factor from their analysis, with a higher score indicat-
ing more-favorable initial conditions.20
Figure 5 plots cumulative GDP growth in the  rst eight
years of transition against the change in the Gini coef cient.
A strong negative relationship is obvious, with those coun-
tries that have experienced better growth performance also
having smaller increases in income inequality. The simple
correlation is 20.86. Figure 5 also plots growth against the
ratio of government transfers to GDP for all eighteen coun-
tries for which we were able to obtain transfer data. The
relationship is strongly positive, with a simple correlation of
0.67 (0.61 in the subsample of fourteen countries for which
we have Gini coef cients). Finding a positive correlation
between transfers and growth is particularly surprising
given the blatant denominator bias driving the correlation in
the opposite direction (higher output growth increases the
denominator of the transfer to GDP ratio).21 It is interesting
that both of these results have also been reported by authors
such as Perotti (1996) for a different but much larger sample
of industrial and developing countries.
These results are at least not inconsistent with recent
developments in growth theory that imply that redistribution
to enhance equality may actually enhance rather than
dampen growth. They also echo Perotti’s 1996 more general
 nding that redistributive expenditures are positively asso-
19 The EBRD report contains ten measures of the degree of transition to
a market economy. Three of the measures relate to enterprises : the degree
of large and small scale enterprise privatization , and the degree of
enterprise restructuring (including elimination of soft-budget constraints) .
Three measures relate to markets and trade: the degree of price liberal-
ization, the degree of trade liberalizatio n and access to foreign exchange ,
and the extent of enforcement actions to prevent abuse of market power.
Two measures relate to  nancial institutions (banking reform and interest
rate liberalization , and the establishmen t of securities markets), and two
measures capture the extent and effectivenes s of the legal framework for
securing property rights and regulating business activity.
20 It is worth noting that this measure is very highly correlated with
distance from Western Europe. Thus, by using this variable to explain
growth, one risks falling into the vacuous conclusion that the central Asian
countries did poorly because they are central Asian countries. However, it
is interesting that Uzbekistan did much better (relatively) than would be
expected given its initial conditions , whereas Bulgaria and Latvia did
much worse.
21 Another problem is that higher transfers do not necessarily imply
more redistribution . As noted by Commander and Lee (1998), transfers in














Poland 1.25 0.272 0.301 0.029 17.7 14.3 1.18
Slovenia 0.47 0.174 0.223 0.049 14.8 13.0 1.24
Czech Republic 20.29 0.194 0.254 0.060 12.1 14.7 1.43
Hungary 21.15 0.248 0.308 0.060 16.5 14.7 1.47
Romania 22.18 0.233 0.280 0.047 8.9 9.8 0.94
Estonia 23.05 0.230 0.354 0.124 10.0 12.5 20.33
Belarus 24.23 0.228 0.288 0.060 8.9 8.3 21.19
Kazakhstan 25.03 0.257 0.354 0.097 6.9 8.3 21.07
Bulgaria 25.03 0.228 0.317 0.089 11.8 10.3 0.55
Lithuania 25.65 0.225 0.324 0.099 9.6 10.5 20.52
Russia 26.14 0.238 0.380 0.142 7.5 9.7 20.34
Kyrgyzstan 26.67 0.260 0.405 0.145 12.4 10.3 21.03
Latvia 26.89 0.225 0.320 0.095 11.8 10.2 20.46
Ukraine 210.64 0.233 0.473 0.240 9.4 8.7 20.91
Annualized cumulative GDP growth is measured over the  rst eight years of transition. The  rst year of transition is 1990 for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic;
1991 for Slovenia; and 1992 for the Baltics, Russia, and other countries of the former Soviet Union. Data on Gini coef cients were taken fromMilanovic (1998, 1999) ,World Bank (1997, 1999, 2000), OECD (1997) ,
and, for Poland, from this paper. Data on average cash transfers from the transition years through 1997 are from Milanovic (1998). The transition indicator is a weighted average of the ten transition indicators in
the EBRD’s 1995 Transition Report (table 2.1). Those indicators are on a scale of 1 to 41, with 1 indicating little progress and 41 indicating a level comparable to that of western industrialized countries. We averaged
the transition indicators within each of the four groupings (scoring a 41 as a 5), and then averaged across those 4 scores, to obtain an overall measure of liberalization. The index of the dif culty of initial conditions
(a higher score indicates more-favorable conditions ) is taken from de Melo et al. (1997).
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ciated with growth. But it is of course possible that some
third factor explains both good growth performance and the
maintenance of income equality in transition economies,
and that the correlation between growth and the change in
inequality has no causal interpretation. To investigate fur-
ther, we tried regressions of growth on changes in the Gini
coef cients, along with the EBRD measure of the extent of
liberalization and the MDGT measure of initial conditions
facing each country (the idea being that the extent of
liberalization or the dif culty of initial conditions are plau-
sible omitted factors that could explain both growth and
changes in inequality).
These results, reported in table 6 indicate that, individu-
ally, the EBRD transition indicator, the MDGT initial con-
ditions measure, and the changes in the Gini coef cients are
all highly signi cantly related to GDP growth. In column 4,
we include all three variables. Interestingly, only the EBRD
transition indicator and the Gini difference are signi cant,
whereas the initial-condition indicator is not. This suggests
that initial conditions did not matter for growth once sub-
sequent policy choices are controlled for. The results in
column 5 con rm this because the adjusted R2 increases
when the initial condition indicator is excluded from the
regression. The coef cient estimates imply that market-
oriented liberalization is positively associated with growth,
and that increasing inequality is negatively associated with
growth.22
Of course, a problem with these results is the potential
endogeneity of the change in inequality. In an attempt to
address this problem, in column 6 we instrument for the
Gini difference using the initial-condition indicator. This
procedure relies on the (admittedly strong) identifying as-
sumption that initial conditions do not directly affect growth
once we control for subsequent policy choices (the transi-
tion indicator). Granted that, in column 6 we are identify-
ing the effect of inequality on growth through variation
in inequality outcomes that can be attributed to initial-
conditions differences (as opposed to changes in inequality
that may have been caused by subsequent growth out-
comes). Interestingly, the coef cient on the Gini difference
does not change much and remains highly signi cant. In
fact, this coef cient is quite stable whether we include
initial conditions in the regression (column 4), use initial
conditions to instrument for the difference (column 6), or
exclude initial conditions entirely and run OLS (column 5).
A coherent interpretation of these results would be that
greater progress towards a market economy framework
enhances growth but that, conditional on the degree of
liberalization, policy that maintains a greater degree of
equality is more conducive to growth. Initial conditions do
not affect growth directly once one controls for policy
choices, but initial conditions do seem to matter through
their effects on policy. In particular, countries with better
initial conditions have not only made more-rapid progress
towards liberalization, but they have also tended to pursue
policies that have resulted in smaller increases in inequality
in the process. Only to the extent that better initial condi-
tions have led to more liberalization or more equality have
they enhanced growth. Of course, as noted, this interpreta-
tion relies on a strong identifying assumption, and other
interpretations cannot be ruled out.
We are naturally cautious about drawing strong conclu-
sions from fourteen data points. But, on the other hand, note
that this is not really a “small sample” but rather the entire
population of Eastern European countries experiencing the
transition process (barring a few for which data are not
available). One might feel we could obtain more-conclusive
results by exploiting the panel aspect of the data, but
inspection of the data over time reveals that, for each
country, there is tremendous persistence in growth perfor-
mance, as well as in the degree of liberalization and the
extent of increase in income inequality. That is, those
22 As additiona l robustness tests, we also tried including as regressors
the initial level of inequality and a dummy for countries of the former
Soviet Union and an interaction of this dummy with the change in
inequality. These additional controls had little effect on the OLS results
presented in table 6.
FIGURE 5.—TRANSFERS, INEQUALITY, AND GROWTH DURING TRANSITION
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countries that have relatively good growth performance, a
relatively high degree of liberalization, and a relatively low
increase in inequality tend to remain that way throughout
the transition, and vice versa. Thus, we do not feel that there
is much to be gained by looking at these data as a panel. It
would be an illusion to think there are many more than
fourteen independent observations to work with here.
Our overall interpretation of these results is that, consis-
tent with the Polish experience that we have analyzed in
detail in this paper, the use of social transfer mechanisms
and other policies to buffer the potential increase in income
inequality, especially in the critical early phase of transition,
appears to be important in generating a successful transition
to a market economy. We have argued that the Polish
experience points to an interesting example of targeting of
transfers that may have been crucial for garnering political
support for the drastic market-oriented reforms that facili-
tated Poland’s strong growth performance in the 1990s.
VII. Concluding Remarks
This paper has argued, based on detailed analysis of
household income and consumption data for the period
1985–1997, that in Poland there is little evidence of a
substantial increase in overall inequality during the transi-
tion that began in 1989–1990. This contradicts the conven-
tional wisdom that the process of transition to a market
economy is inevitably accompanied by a surge in inequality.
However, we did  nd that earnings inequality among work-
ers increased substantially during the transition. We also
documented that social transfer mechanisms played an im-
portant role in dampening the increase in overall inequality
and in between-group income dynamics. We argued that,
although the structure of transfers may not necessarily have
been ideal from the perspective of preventing an increase in
poverty, transfer mechanisms may have played a critical
role in maintaining social stability and in reducing political
resistance to the structural reforms that were undertaken in
the early years of the transition and that facilitated Poland’s
subsequent strong growth performance. Finally, we pre-
sented cross-country evidence on inequality, transfers, and
growth in transition economies that, although not conclu-
sive, is consistent with the notion that social transfers and
other policies aimed at mitigating increases in inequality
(especially in the critical early phase of transition) may be
conducive to growth.
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APPENDIX ACCOUNTING FOR THE CHANGE
IN SURVEY FREQUENCY IN 1993
A few important changes were introduced to the HBS in 1993. Starting
in that year, households were surveyed for only one month rather than for
a full quarter. In addition, the sampling scheme was modi ed to provide
better coverage of the self-employed and other groups such as police,
security, and military personnel . Other aspects of the survey, such as the
two-stage sampling scheme and the structure of the survey instrument ,
were left essentially unchanged .
For the purposes of measuring cross-sectiona l inequality, the change in
survey frequency is the most important change. In this appendix , we
develop a technique for adjusting the 1993–1997 income and consumption
data for the increased variability that may be attributabl e to the shift from
quarterly to monthly reporting. A more detailed description , along with
relevant estimation results, can be found in the working paper version of
this paper.
We begin by assuming the following “statistical” or “forecasting”
model for income:
Yht 5 a1t 1 btXht 1 steht, (1)
where Yht is income of household h in period t, Xht is a vector of
household characteristic s used to predict household income, and eht is the
unpredictabl e or idiosyncrati c component of household income scaled to
have a standard deviation of unity. The time-speci c standard deviation
that scales this idiosyncrati c component is denoted by st. Our objective is
to estimate the increase in st during 1993–1997 that is due solely to the
switch to a monthly reporting interval.
We estimate equation (1) separately for each quarter from 1985–1992
and for each month from 1993–1997. The variables included in Xht are
controls for education level, age and sex of the household head, controls
for presence of a spouse and age of the spouse, and controls for household
size, urban residence , and primary income source of the household head.
Although most of the coef cients were stable over time in these regres-
FIGURE A1.—TIME POLYNOMIALS, STAGE II REGRESSIONS
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sions, one interesting aspect was that the education level of the household
head became more important as the transition progressed . A key feature of
the results was that the R2 values dropped sharply after 1993. This is
presumably due to greater idiosyncrati c variability of income, as well as
greater relative importance of measurement error, when income is re-
ported at a monthly rather than quarterly frequency.
Next, we assume that the standard deviations of the residuals from
estimation of equation (1) follow the process:
ln st 5 p0 1 p1t 1 p2t
2 1 p3t
3 1 p4YBt 1 p5I @t . 96# 1 ht
t 5 2, 4, . . . , 95; t 5 97, 98, . . . , 156.
(2)
Here t is a monthly time index. For the years 1985 through 1992, the data
are quarterly, so t is assigned as the midpoint of the interval covered by
each quarter (that is, t 5 2, 4, . . . , 95). The variable I[t . 96] is an
indicator for the period 1993–1997. Thus, the coef cient p5 captures the
structura l shift in the error standard deviation attributabl e to the shift in
data frequency. The time polynomials capture the evolution of the error
standard deviation over time due to changes in within-group income
inequality, controlling for the group characteristic s included in Xht. The
term YBt controls for the effect of changes in mean income on the
error standard deviation . Finally, ht captures purely idiosyncrati c period-
speci c changes in income variability.
Analysis of the residuals from equation (1) indicates that household s
with different primary income sources (that is, worker-headed households ,
farm households , mixed farmer-worker households , and pensioner house-
holds) have very different error variances, as well as different behavior of
the error variances over time. Therefore, we estimate equation (2) sepa-
rately for each household type, using the time series of residual variances
from (1).
In  gureA1 (top panel), we plot the time polynomial , holding YB t  xed
at the full sample mean, and setting I[t . 96] to zero. These plots indicate
that within-group income inequality did begin to grow substantiall y in
1996–1997, even after controlling for changes in the scale of real income.
Including the time dummy (lower panel) shows the effect of the adjust-
ment on within-group residual variances . It is interesting to note that
residual inequality trends up over the entire sample for worker-headed
households , is rather  at for pensioner-heade d households , and, for the
other two groups, declines through the early 1990s and then begins to
increase.
Finally, we adjust the income data for 1993–1997 to account for the
increase in the idiosyncratic variance that we estimate occurred solely due
to the shift to a monthly reporting period in January 1993. We de ne
adjusted income for the 1993–1997 period as
YAht 5 a1t 1 b tXht 1 $st /exp~p5!%eˆht t 5 97, 98, . . . , 156. (3)
Here eˆht is the estimated residual from equation (1) and p5 is our estimate
from equation (2) of the increase in the log of the residual standard
deviation due to the switch to monthly income reporting . The scale factors
exp(p5) are 1.179, 1.446, 1.222, and 1.045 for worker-headed households ,
farm households , mixed worker-farmer, and pensioner households , re-
spectively.
A problem we confront is that a representativ e sample of the self-
employed was not obtained in the pre-1993 surveys. Representation of this
group in the pre-1993 data is too small to obtain reliable estimates of the
group- and time-speci c residual variances. Besides, we could not be sure
of the extent to which any change in variance for this group in 1993–1997
is due to the shift to monthly reporting versus increased representativenes s
of the self-employed sample. Thus, we simply assume the same scale
factor for the self-employed as we do for workers (1.179). In any case, it
turns out that our results on changes in inequality are not very sensitive to
how we treat the self-employed , because they constitute only about 5% to
6% of the sample.
We also adjust the consumption data using the same procedure . The
estimated scale factors for consumption are 1.108, 1.149, 1.118, and 1.086
for worker-headed households , farm households , mixed worker-farmer,
and pensioner-heade d households , respectively. As expected , these are
lower than the income adjustment factors and are similar across different
groups. For pensioner households , the jump in consumption variability is
greater than the jump in income variability with the switch to monthly
reporting . Although these households have more stable month-to-month
income streams than other households , there is no obvious reason to
expect their month-to-month variability in tastes for consumption to be
lower. Finally, we also adjust the consumption data for the self-employed
using the same scale factor we used for workers.
TABLE A1.—EQUIVALENCE SCALES AS A FUNCTION OF HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION




1 HD 5 Male, 31–60 0.54 0.59 0.55 0.74 0.71
2 HD 5 Male, 18–30 0.54 0.59 0.55 0.72 0.70
3 HD 5 Male, .60 0.54 0.59 0.55 0.74 0.68
4 HD 5 Female, 31–60 0.46 0.59 0.55 0.66 0.65
5 HD 5 Female, 18–30 0.46 0.59 0.55 0.63 0.64
6 HD 5 Female, .60 0.46 0.59 0.55 0.60 0.53
Married Couples
7 HD 5 Male, 31–60; Female, 31–60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
8 HD 5 Male, 18–30; Female 18–30 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.92
9 HD 5 Male, .60; Female .60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.03 0.92
Married couples with one child
HD 5 Male, 31–60; Female, 31–60
10 Male/Female, ,7 1.23 1.29 1.17 1.12 1.10
11 Male/Female, 8–12 1.32 1.29 1.24 1.16 1.14
12 Male, 13–17 1.46 1.29 1.29 1.19 1.17
13 Female, 13–17 1.41 1.29 1.29 1.14 1.13
Married Couples with older dependents
HD 5 Male, 31–60; Female, 31–60
14 Male, .60 1.54 1.41 1.40 1.24 1.23
15 Female, .60 1.46 1.41 1.40 1.32 1.29
16 Male, .60; Female, .60 2.00 2.00 1.80 1.63 1.59
HD indicates the head of household. The equivalence scales shown in the last two columns are based on OLS and IV estimates, respectively, of food share equations using the HBS data. Equivalence scales based
on IV estimates (column 5) are used in the paper.
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